). A typology of ideological attitudes towards social solidarity and social control. by Likki,  T. & Staerklé,  C.
Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology
J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 24: 406–421 (2014)
Published online 16 January 2014 in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/casp.2181A Typology of Ideological Attitudes Towards Social
Solidarity and Social ControlTIINA LIKKI* and CHRISTIAN STAERKLÉ
Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, SwitzerlandABSTRACT
Research on ideological attitudes has identiﬁed two main dimensions that refer to two fundamental
features of group organization: social solidarity and social control. In response to prior research that
has studied their relationship mainly from a correlational perspective, this paper introduces a social
reality model based on psychological functionality of ideological attitudes. Social position variables
(education, income and material vulnerability) and insecurity variables (fear of crime and distrust) are
used to predict the interplay between ideological attitudes towards social solidarity and social control.
Using K-means cluster analysis, a typology with four patterns of support for solidarity and control
(‘socials’, ‘repressives’, ‘minimalists’ and ‘social-repressives’) was created, on the basis of represen-
tative survey data for the UK, France and Germany (N= 7034). Results from logistic regression anal-
yses show that the proposed social reality model explains membership in typology categories, with
similar results across the three countries. Overall, the model underscores the social origins of ideolog-
ical attitudes as functional responses to perceived social reality. The paper illustrates how the social
psychological study of ideological attitudes may be enriched by a typological approach that examines
patterns of attitudes rather than single dimensions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Political attitudes have long been analysed as a function of a single left–right or liberal–
conservative dimension (e.g. Comrey & Newmeyer, 1965; Downs, 1957; Jacoby, 1991).
There is, however, substantial evidence suggesting that a one-dimensional model of ideology
rarely provides a satisfying account of how people take up a stance towards political issues
(Kerlinger, 1984; Kinder, 1998). Research on the structure of political attitudes has indeed
consistently obtained at least two relatively independent dimensions of ideological beliefs
(see Saucier, 2000), opposing for example social conservatism and economic conservatism
(Hughes, 1975), freedom and equality (Rokeach, 1973) and, more recently, conservation*Correspondence to: Tiina Likki and Christian Staerklé, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lausanne, CH-1015
Lausanne, Switzerland.
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Social solidarity and social control 407and self-transcendence (Schwartz, 1992) and right-wing authoritarianism and social
dominance orientation (Duckitt, 2001; Saucier, 2000).
In the present paper, we analyse two sets of ideological attitudes that we believe capture
the central aspects of any organized and coordinated social group, namely social solidarity
and social control. These two basic dimensions are seen to subsume much of the ideolog-
ical content of earlier dual conceptualizations of political attitudes. We argue that two key
issues have not been addressed satisfactorily in prior research: ﬁrst, the varying strengths
of the relationship between solidarity and control at the individual level and, second, the
social origins of such beliefs that may explain why certain individuals are more likely to
endorse them.SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND SOCIAL CONTROL: TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY
Social solidarity and social control are two basic modes of regulation of social groups that
aim at a stable, effective and morally justiﬁable group organization. Social solidarity refers
to forms of reciprocity and collective responsibility among group members that allow
taking care of the more vulnerable members of the group, such as the old or the sick. In
most modern societies, such solidarity is implemented by various programmes of the
welfare state that ensure that adequate basic needs are met. Social control, in turn, refers
to a ‘collection of mechanisms to induce compliance to norms’ (Meier, 1982, p. 43). The
purported aim of social control is the maintenance of social stability through law
enforcement as well as formal and informal sanctions of norm transgressions. Large
differences exist between societies as to the relative importance of these two modes
of group regulation. The United States, for example, emphasizes control over solidarity,
with zero tolerance policies and low levels of redistribution, whereas Scandinavian
countries prioritize solidarity over control.
Considering the necessary interrelatedness of social solidarity and social control as basic
strategies of social regulation within groups, the lack of work analysing the relationship
between these two sets of ideological attitudes seems surprising. The research that is most
relevant to this issue has examined the correlation between social dominance orientation
and right-wing authoritarianism (Dallago, Cima, Roccato, Ricolﬁ, & Mirisola, 2008;
Duckitt, 2001; Duriez, Van Hiel, & Kossowska, 2005; Mirisola, Sibley, Boca, & Duckitt,
2007; Roccato & Ricolﬁ, 2005). However, these studies were mostly concerned with the
analysis of the linear relationship between the two dimensions, suggesting that higher
social dominance orientation scores (comparable with low social solidarity) should be
related to higher levels of right-wing authoritarianism (comparable with high social control).
This positive relationship has also been shown to be stronger among individuals with higher
levels of ideological consistency (Duckitt, 2001; Duriez et al., 2005), reﬂecting a greater ten-
dency to constrain one’s attitudes on societal issues along a left–right dimension (Converse,
1964; Zaller, 1992). Such consistency is said to result from political socialization as well as
from political interest and identiﬁcation (Duriez et al., 2005; Mirisola et al., 2007).
We question the view that only certain combinations of ideological attitudes are sophis-
ticated or meaningful by arguing that even less ‘consistent’ combinations of ideological
attitudes—such as low social dominance orientation combined with high right-wing
authoritarianism—can be meaningful and reasonable responses to material and social cir-
cumstances. We suggest that in order to fully account for the relationship between the twoCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 24: 406–421 (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/casp
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the relationship between social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism. In-
stead, we put forward a typological approach that examines different constellations of
mean levels of attitudes such as high support for social solidarity coupled with high
support for social control.
The main beneﬁt of a typological approach is that it allows predicting different combi-
nations of attitudes and examining the factors that lead individuals to adopt each pattern.
Typological approaches, although rarely used in social psychology, have been used to
uncover and predict cognitive and behavioural patterns that were earlier ignored or consid-
ered to be inconsistent. Examples include John Berry’s (1997) framework of acculturation
strategies (low vs high on dimensions of cultural maintenance and contact) and Susan
Fiske’s stereotype content model (low vs high on dimensions of warmth and competence)
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Similar to Fiske et al. (2002), we argue that mixed
combinations of solidarity and control are frequent because they are psychologically func-
tional rather than inconsistent.
Our typology of ideological attitudes builds on the work by Rokeach (1973) and
Braithwaite (1994) on human values. These authors stressed the need to analyse different
combinations of ideological values, suggesting that the two value dimensions are indepen-
dent and not mutually exclusive. Rokeach (1973) proposed that major modern ideologies
are deﬁned by the differing priorities given to the values of freedom (cf. social control) and
equality (cf. social solidarity). The high versus low priorities placed on the two values
yield four cells, each corresponding to an ideology: socialism (high equality and high free-
dom), capitalism (low equality and high freedom), fascism (low equality and low freedom)
and communism (high equality and low freedom). We take from Rokeach the insight that
ideological dimensions may coexist and apply it to attitudes on the individual level.
Whereas Rokeach’s typology classiﬁes political ideologies, we construct an analogous
typology of individual ideological attitudes with four patterns of attitudes that we term
social positioning (high solidarity and low control), repressive positioning (low solidarity
and high control), minimalist positioning (low solidarity and low control), and social-
repressive positioning (high solidarity and high control) (Figure 1). The aim of this
paper is to account for individuals’ position in one of the four categories as a function
of perceived social reality.HIGH SOCIAL CONTROL 
LOW SOCIAL CONTROL 
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Figure 1. Typology of ideological positioning.
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The proposed social reality model is based on the assumption that ideological attitudes are
psychologically functional responses to perceived social reality. It thereby emphasizes the im-
portance of both objective and subjective social reality individuals face in their day-to-day
lives as a basis of their ideological attitudes.Social position
A central aspect of perceived social reality is one’s position in the social hierarchy. People
belonging to groups that differ in terms of social status are likely to have different views of
social reality that subsequently lead to different social motivations and ideological posi-
tioning. We distinguish between material and cultural forms of social position (Bourdieu,
1979/1984) and argue that they differentially predict ideological attitudes. In terms of
material position, assessed objectively by income and subjectively by perceived material
vulnerability, members of high-status groups are likely to be motivated to maintain their
privileged status, whereas members of low-status groups will strive to improve their
status—a logic in line with collective self-interest (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). Consistent
with this reasoning, both survey and experimental research on social dominance orienta-
tion has conﬁrmed that one’s position in the social structure has an effect on preference
for hierarchy, with members of dominant groups displaying higher social dominance
orientation scores (Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Schmitt, Branscombe,
& Kappen, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Following a similar logic, individuals with
high material status can be expected to support stricter repressive and authoritarian policies
as a way to maintain hierarchical status relations and their advantage over subordinate
groups (Jackman, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, Chapter 8).
The relationship between education—the cultural dimension of social status—and
support for social solidarity is less straightforward. If used as a measure of social position
without controlling for material status, education tends to be related to less social solidarity
(e.g. Staerklé, Likki, & Scheidegger, 2012). According to the enlightenment hypothesis,
however, individuals integrate central values of Western societies during education,
including the value of equality (Robinson & Bell, 1978). Furthermore, exposure to infor-
mation about the degree of inequality in society during education is expected to increase
support for inequality reduction policies (Lewin-Epstein, Kaplan, & Levanon, 2003).
With respect to support for social control, it is ﬁrmly established since Lipset (1959) that
more authoritarian attitudes are associated with lower levels of education. Such effects may
reﬂect identity management strategies: Demands for more law and order and punitive dero-
gation of out-groups can serve the purpose of self-afﬁrmation by members of low-status
groups (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1991; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).Insecurity
In addition to one’s location in the social structure, perceived social reality consists of an
experiential dimension related to lived or perceived insecurity (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003;
Hammer, Widmer, & Robert, 2009; Jackson, 2009). We differentiate between physical
and social insecurity. In physical insecurity, such as fear of crime, the environment is
perceived as physically threatening and dangerous. Such perceptions lead to calls forCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 24: 406–421 (2014)
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perceived threat, fear and uncertainty increase authoritarian responses (Doty, Peterson, &
Winter, 1991; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997). Yet, fear of crime is
not only an individual perception of a dangerous social environment but also a collective
response strategically enhanced by political elites to orient attention away from social
inequalities to a purported safety problem (Bauman, 1999; Garland, 2001). Illustrating this
more ideological reading of fear of crime, recent research has begun exploring the relation-
ship between fear of crime and social insecurity (Vieno, Roccato, & Russo, 2013). Fear of
crime may, then, lead either to a rejection of solidarity if social control is perceived as the
primary solution to physical insecurity or to demands for solidarity if fear of crime is
recognized as a reﬂection of economic inequality.
Social insecurity, in turn, refers to a lack of trust, deﬁned as a general belief in the
benign and trustworthy nature of others (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). As many authors
have argued, trust is a central element of social order and essential for harmonious and
efﬁcient everyday relations (Barber, 1983; Hardin, 1995; Luhmann, 1979). High trust in
fellow citizens maintains a sense of cooperation and fairness within groups and, hence,
decreases fear (De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001). Because trust counteracts fears of
free riding and strengthens the expectation of reciprocity, distrust should lead to a lower
willingness to support social solidarity. At the same time, distrust may fuel fear and
support for social control, for example in the form of punitive policies.HYPOTHESES
The aim of the present paper is to show that a social reality approach can explain different
patterns of support for social solidarity and social control. Speciﬁcally, controlling for age
and gender, we predict the following:
(a) Social positioning (high solidarity and low control) is related to the following: (1)
lower levels of income; (2) higher material vulnerability; (3) higher education; and
(4) lower physical and social insecurity. According to our predictions, individuals in
this category feel secure, therefore rejecting social control that is perceived as unneces-
sary. They demand solidarity because higher education has instilled values of equality in
them, or because they themselves are in need of material support.
(b) Repressive positioning (low solidarity and high control) is related to the following: (1)
higher levels of income; (2) lower material vulnerability; (3) lower education; and (4)
higher physical and social insecurity. Individuals with a repressive proﬁle should
reject solidarity because they are ﬁnancially secure but demand social control because
they feel physically and socially insecure and because they have less cultural capital.
(c) Minimalist positioning (low solidarity and low control) is related to the following: (1)
higher levels of income; (2) lower material vulnerability; (3) higher education; and (4)
lower physical and social insecurity. Individuals in this category are expected to reject
both solidarity and control because they feel carefree and secure with regard to their
material position as well as their physical and social environments.
(d) Social-repressive positioning (high solidarity and high control) is related to the following:
(1) lower levels of income; (2) higher material vulnerability; (3) lower education;
and (4) higher physical and social insecurity. Individuals with a social-repressive
proﬁle are expected to demand both social solidarity and social control because they
are materially and culturally disadvantaged and because they feel physically and
socially insecure.Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 24: 406–421 (2014)
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Participants and procedure
The data used in the study come from the European Social Survey 2008, a large interna-
tional survey on social and political attitudes. The countries chosen for the present analysis
include the UK (n= 2303), France (n = 2045) and Germany (n= 2686), with an overall
N= 7034. The data are representative of the population aged 16 years and older. The num-
ber of missing values was low for all variables except for income that had 352 (15.3%)
missing values in the UK, 207 (10.1%) in France and 465 (17.3%) in Germany. Instead
of listwise deletion, we imputed missing values for income using the multiple imputation
procedure in SPSS Statistics version 19.0. Pooled estimates using multiple imputation
yielded results that were highly similar to results using the original dataset with listwise
deletion for income.
We do not advance country-speciﬁc hypotheses as we expect the basic processes of
ideological patterning to remain essentially identical across the three countries, despite
differences in the institutional set-ups of solidarity and control. In terms of welfare state
institutions, Germany and France represent so-called conservative-corporatist welfare
regimes, characterized by preservation of class differentials and a strong role for family
and community in beneﬁt provision. Germany is largely based on individual insurance
schemes and the principle of subsidiarity (private responsibility whenever possible),
whereas the French system is more tax based. The UK, in turn, is a liberal welfare regime
dominated by modest social insurance plans and strict entitlement rules (Esping-Andersen,
1990). The three countries also differ in terms of criminal justice systems and the severity
of penal policies (e.g. Tonry, 2004).Measures
Social solidarity. Support for social solidarity was measured with four items asking
participants to rate the extent to which governments should be responsible for ensuring
the following rights: job for everyone, health care for the sick, standard of living for the
old and standard of living for the unemployed. Responses ranged on an 11-point scale from
0= should not be government’s responsibility at all to 10 = should be entirely government’s
responsibility.1 The four items were averaged to form a scale with adequate reliability
(Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .68 to .78 in the three countries). Table 1 presents
means, standard deviations and alphas for all measures in each country. Overall, attitudes
were clearly in favour of social solidarity with means ranging from 7.15 (France) to 7.53
(UK).
Social control. Support for social control was measured with four items relating to
different aspects of social control. The ﬁrst three items include ‘People who break the
law should be given much harsher sentences than they are these days’, ‘Schools must teach
children to obey authority’ and ‘If a man is suspected of planning a terrorist attack, the1We also created a measure of social solidarity that taps egalitarianism more generally. A three-item measure of
egalitarianism including items such as ‘Large differences in people’s incomes are acceptable to properly reward
differences in talents and efforts’ revealed poor internal consistency: Cronbach’s α= .57 (UK), α= .56 (France),
and α= .60 (Germany). This was likely due to item formulations that could be interpreted as measuring concepts
other than egalitarianism, such as meritocracy or support for the equity principle.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 24: 406–421 (2014)
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Table 1. Sample descriptive statistics
UK France Germany
Range
(n= 2303) (n= 2045) (n= 2686)
M SD α M SD α M SD α
Social solidarity 7.53 1.30 0.68 7.15 1.47 0.75 7.32 1.66 0.78 0–10
Social control 7.52 1.67 0.67 7.13 1.95 0.64 6.59 1.79 0.64 0–10
Education 3.34 1.36 — 3.05 1.55 — 3.66 1.11 — 0–6
Income 5.33 3.00 — 5.82 2.85 — 4.60 2.51 — 1–10
Material vulnerability 1.94 0.65 0.60 1.89 0.64 0.65 1.83 0.59 0.57 1–4
Fear of crime 2.08 0.68 0.64 2.03 0.71 0.67 1.82 0.60 0.63 1–4
Distrust 4.47 1.76 0.76 5.08 1.64 0.64 4.73 1.74 0.71 0–10
412 T. Likki and C. Staerklépolice should have the power to keep him in prison until they are satisﬁed he was not in-
volved’. The response scale for these items ranged from 1= agree strongly to 5 = disagree
strongly. In order to increase scale reliability, a fourth item was taken from Schwartz’s
(2003) Human Values Scale that asked respondents to indicate perceived similarity with
a ﬁctitious person: ‘It is important to him that the government ensures his safety against
all threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens’; responses ranged
from 1 = very much like me to 6 = not like me at all. Because this item had a different
response scale, standardized scores were used to create the indicator, and responses to
items were reverse coded so that higher scores indicate greater support for social control
(α = .64–.67). There was fairly strong overall support for social control, with means ranging
from 6.59 in Germany to 7.52 in the UK on a recoded scale ranging from 0 to 10.
Cultural and material social position. The ﬁrst component of the social reality model
assesses respondents’ social status and their position in the social structure. Level of edu-
cation was used as a measure of social status that reﬂects its cultural dimension. Values
ranged from 0= not completed primary education to 6 = second stage of tertiary. Income
was used to assess the material dimension of social position. Participants’ responses for
household’s total net income were recoded for comparability into 10 percentile categories
by country. In addition to these two ‘objective’ measures of social position, a ‘subjective’
measure of material vulnerability was created from three items of perceived likelihood of
life course events with negative material consequences occurring in the next 12months:
having less time for paid work than desired because of the care given to family members,
not having enough money for household necessities and not receiving health care in case
of illness (α= .57–.65). Responses ranged from 1= not at all likely to 4 = very likely. We
also controlled for the effects of age (measured in years) and gender.
Physical and social insecurity. The second component of the social reality model
refers to experiential and perceived insecurity in relation to one’s physical safety (physical
insecurity) and to social distrust (social insecurity). To measure physical insecurity, we
created an indicator of fear of crime consisting of three items: ‘How safe do you feel
walking alone in your local area after dark?’ (1 = very safe to 4 = very unsafe), ‘How often
do you worry about your home being burgled?’ and ‘How often do you worry about
becoming a victim of violent crime?’ (1 = all or most of the time to 4 = never). Responses
to items were recoded so that higher scores on the scale indicate greater physical insecurityCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 24: 406–421 (2014)
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Social solidarity and social control 413(α= .64–.67). To measure social insecurity, we created an indicator of distrust consisting
of three items: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’, ‘Do you think that most people would try
to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?’, and ‘Would
you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for
themselves?’ Responses ranged from 0 to 10 and were recode so that higher scores on the
scale indicate greater distrust (α = .64–.76).RESULTS
Table 2 presents the correlations between all predictor variables in the overall sample of
three countries. A cursory look at the ﬁndings shows that most correlations between pre-
dictor variables were between .10 and .20, suggesting that collinearity will not be an issue.
The highest correlations were found between education and income (.33) and between
income and material vulnerability (.25). A weak positive overall correlation was found
between social solidarity and social control (.14), indicating that individuals who support
solidarity also tend to support control.A typology of support for social solidarity and social control
In order to analyse the combined patterns of social solidarity and social control, we created a
typology of policy positioning using K-means clustering, a method adapted for grouping
together similar cases in large samples (Aldenderfer & Blashﬁeld, 1984; Everitt, Landau,
Leese, & Stahl, 2011). This procedure classiﬁes participants by maximizing dissimilarity be-
tween categories and similarity within categories. The number of categories was pre-deﬁned
to four as we theoretically expected to ﬁnd the categories of socials (high solidarity and low
control), repressives (low solidarity and high control), minimalists (low solidarity and low
control), and social-repressives (high solidarity and high control) as a function of the dimen-
sions of social solidarity and social control. Many authors have criticized the practice of
choosing initial centroids (i.e. values of cluster means) randomly (e.g. Tan, Steinbach, &
Kumar, 2005, Chapter 8), so we used as initial values the ﬁnal cluster centres obtained from
an analysis conducted on the pooled dataset including all three countries.
Mean values for the two dimensions of social solidarity and social control attitudes for
each category are presented in Table 3. Regarding levels of social solidarity in the fourTable 2. Correlations in the global (three-country) sample
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Education —
2. Income 0.33 —
3. Material vulnerability 0.12 0.25 —
4. Fear of crime 0.10 0.06 0.19 —
5. Distrust 0.13 0.11 0.21 0.20 —
6. Social solidarity 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.02* —
7. Social control 0.29 0.16 0.10 0.24 0.18 0.14
Note: All correlations are signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed, unless noted otherwise.
*p> .05.
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Social solidarity and social control 415categories, one can observe, ﬁrstly, that minimalists are the only group not clearly in
favour of social solidarity (means range from 5.04 in Germany to 5.16 in the UK on a scale
from 0 to 10). This means that even repressives, theorized to score high only on social con-
trol, show relatively high levels of solidarity in our empirically based typology (from 6.70
in France to 6.90 in Germany). Secondly, post hoc tests (Games-Howell) show that levels
of social solidarity are highest among social-repressives, whose mean level of solidarity is
signiﬁcantly higher not only than that of repressives and minimalists but also than that of
socials (p< .05). In other words, the group with highest solidarity is also the group that
asks for most social control. Regarding support for social control, the only category clearly
not in favour of repressive policies is the socials (means range from 4.44 in France to 4.83
in the UK). There is no difference in the level of social control between repressives and
social-repressives. Overall, the patterns of means in the four categories are highly similar
across the three countries, indicating cross-national validity of the obtained solution.
Regarding the distribution of participants in the four categories, the repressive category
is largest of the four categories in the UK (40.4%) and France (37.9%), followed by
social-repressives. In Germany, the order is reversed, with social-repressives (29.9 %)
as the largest category and repressives (25.3%) as the second largest category. Socials
occupy the third position in all countries, whereas minimalists are the smallest group
in all countries.Predicting proﬁles of ideological attitudes: logistic regressions
Binary logistic regressions were conducted separately for each of the four categories,
predicting membership in each category (coded as 1) compared with membership in the
rest of the sample (coded as 0). The regressions were conducted on the dataset including
all three countries, and interactions were computed between each centred predictor vari-
able and country dummy variables in order to test whether the effects of predictors differed
across countries (on the basis of theory, we did not expect differences between the coun-
tries). Only signiﬁcant interactions were retained for the ﬁnal model, presented in Table 4.
For reasons of space, we only present coefﬁcients for the UK and do not show estimates
for each Country × Predictor interaction (these can be obtained from authors, as well as full
models for each country as a reference category). Where country differences were found,
these are mentioned in the text.
Social positioning. Membership in the category of socials (high solidarity and low
control) was predicted by all variables except material vulnerability. High income and high
education predicted social positioning, except for France where income had no effect.
Clearly, high social status is related to a positioning that simultaneously supports social
solidarity and rejects social control. This result goes against the self-interest hypothesis
according to which members of higher-status groups would try to maintain their social
position by opposing solidarity and increasing social control. With respect to education,
the positive effect may indicate a more ‘enlightened’ stance due to democratic equality
values and awareness about inequality acquired during education. Membership in the
social positioning category was furthermore predicted by low fear of crime and low
distrust, indicating that individuals who feel physically and socially secure tend to support
institutional solidarity without demanding social control.Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 24: 406–421 (2014)
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Table 4. Binary logistic regressions predicting social, repressive, minimalist and social-repressive
positioning
Model 1: social
Model 2:
repressive
Model 3:
minimalist
Model 4: social-
repressive
B SE B SE B SE B SE
Constant 1.88*** 0.08 0.41*** 0.05 2.51*** 0.09 0.64*** 0.05
Gender (1 = female) 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.15* 0.07 0.07 0.06
Age 0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.00
Education 0.34*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.17*** 0.02
Income 0.09*** 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06*** 0.02 0.05** 0.02
Material vulnerability 0.08 0.06 0.11* 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.16*** 0.05
Fear of crime 0.52*** 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.19** 0.06 0.20*** 0.04
Distrust 0.26*** 0.04 0.08*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
Cox and Nell R2 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.06
Nagelkerke R2 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.09
Note: Estimates are unstandardized coefﬁcients for the UK. Estimates in bold differ across countries (see text).
The table does not include estimates for the effects of country dummies and the interactions between country
and predictor variables. These can be obtained from authors.
*p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001.
416 T. Likki and C. StaerkléRepressive positioning. Membership in the category of repressives (low solidarity and
high control) was associated with low levels of education and low material vulnerability,
whereas income was unrelated to repressive positioning. As predicted by our social reality
model, fear of crime and distrust predicted repressive positioning positively in most cases,
following the idea that perceived insecurity gives rise to demands for protection and calls
for restoring moral values.
Minimalist positioning. Minimalist positioning (low solidarity and low control) was
predicted by high material status. Individuals with higher income (in all three countries)
and lower subjective material vulnerability (in France and in Germany) were more likely
to endorse a minimalist positioning, whereas education had no effect on minimalist posi-
tioning. Fear of crime, in turn, was negatively related to minimalist positioning whereas
distrust had no effect. Overall, then, the minimalist positioning is related to a carefree
and optimistic perception of social reality: Being ﬁnancially secure and not feeling under
threat lead to a libertarian attitude where institutional involvement is considered unneces-
sary. Such individuals do not require society to grant them either social protection or
enforcement of normative compliance.
Social-repressive positioning. As predicted, social-repressive positioning (high soli-
darity and high control) was related to both low education and low income, and to strong
feelings of material vulnerability. These ﬁndings suggest that the social-repressive pattern
of ideological beliefs is most clearly related to low social status coupled with perceived
risk and danger. In support of this interpretation, higher fear of crime (and in Germany
higher distrust) was also related to social-repressive positioning. Overall, the results
suggest that social reality, in terms of both low social position and perceived insecurity,
is an important driving force behind social-repressive positioning.Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 24: 406–421 (2014)
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To verify the distinctiveness of our typological approach, we also ran linear regression
models that separately predicted the dimensions of social solidarity and social control in
each country (results available from the authors). These linear models reveal important dif-
ferences in explanatory variables compared with the typological approach: Low income,
for example, predicts support for social solidarity in the linear model, whereas high income
predicts membership in the social positioning category in the typological analysis. A
similar discrepancy can be found with respect to education level: A low level of education
predicts support for social solidarity in the linear analysis, but a high level of education
predicts membership in the social positioning category. Thus, predicting support for soli-
darity in relation to positionings toward social control yields a fuller and more precise pic-
ture than predicting either dimension separately.DISCUSSION
This research examined the interplay of ideological attitudes towards social solidarity and
towards social control in representative samples of three European populations: the UK,
France and Germany. We have argued that both social solidarity and social control address
fundamental issues of social order, namely the question of taking care of weaker members
of the society and the question of law enforcement and compliance with group norms. We
predicted that a functionalist social reality model consisting of social position variables and
insecurity factors explains where individuals fall on the two dimensions of solidarity and
control.
The results obtained were highly similar across the three contexts. We were able to show
that variables in the social reality model powerfully and predictably accounted for different
patterns of ideological positioning, lending support to the idea that combinations of soli-
darity and control are functionally consistent. Although inconsistent from a traditional
left–right conceptualization of political attitudes, social-repressive positioning (high sup-
port for both social solidarity and social control) is explained with a sombre and pessimis-
tic view of social reality, characteristic of low-status positions (Castel, 1995). Conversely,
the minimalist rejection of both social solidarity and social control is understandable from
the standpoint of a carefree individual with no material or security concerns, giving rise to
a libertarian view of social reality typically found in high-status individuals (Staerklé,
Delay, Gianettoni, & Roux, 2007). The social reality model, therefore, underscores the
social origins of ideological attitudes that are seen as psychologically functional responses
to perceived social reality (Scheidegger & Staerklé, 2011).
Our typological approach provides a novel and alternative way of examining relation-
ships between ideological attitudes. Previous work has focused on correlations, explaining
positive correlations between political attitudes such as right-wing authoritarianism and
social dominance orientation as the result of ideologically consistent belief systems
(Duckitt, 2001; Duriez et al., 2005; Mirisola et al., 2007). Such correlations, however,
do not allow distinguishing whether a negative or low correlation is due to low support
for both dimensions (minimalist positioning) or high support for both dimensions
(social-repressive positioning). As we have shown in the present study, minimalist posi-
tioning is predicted differently by social reality variables than social-repressive position-
ing, despite the fact that both patterns are characterized by a positive correlation betweenCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 24: 406–421 (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/casp
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view of ideological attitudes as politically and psychologically consistent or inconsistent.
Furthermore, the comparison with the results from linear regressions predicting social sol-
idarity and social control separately suggests that a typological approach provides different
and sometimes surprising insights to ideological attitudes. Highly educated individuals are
for example likely to fall in the social positioning category (typological analysis) but not
support social solidarity (linear analysis).
Finally, the size of the four categories across the three countries invites a reﬂection on
the strength and prevalence of the different solidarity–control attitude patterns in public
opinion. Whereas in the UK and in France, the repressives make up the largest category,
followed by social-repressives, in Germany, the four categories are roughly equally distrib-
uted. The socials are relatively strong in France and in Germany, whereas the minimalists
are the minority category across all three countries. These ﬁndings suggest that repressive
attitudes are widespread in all three contexts and that these repressive attitudes are
frequently associated with calls for redistribution. Far from being an exception, the
social-repressive attitude pattern (which is inconsistent from a traditional left–right
perspective) makes up 30% of the total sample. One can expect that individuals holding
this attitude pattern are particularly sensitive to populist right-wing parties that put forward
a mixture of social-redistributive and repressive-authoritarian measures to attract a vulner-
able and often precarious electorate.CONCLUSION
Our research suffers from a number of shortcomings. First, like in most comparative
survey research, the available items were not ideal to assess the theoretical constructs. In
particular, the internal consistency of the social control, material vulnerability and fear
of crime measures was not fully satisfactory. The ﬁndings should therefore be interpreted
with the necessary caution. Second, as in any cross-sectional, correlational study, it is not
possible to ascertain causal relationships between variables. In order to do so, future
research should use longitudinal rather than correlational data on ideological attitudes. Third,
K-means clustering techniques may be criticized for the difﬁculty of choosing appropriate
initial centroids and their impact on ﬁnding an optimal cluster structure. Nevertheless,
we hope to have shown that clustering techniques are powerful tools for studying attitude
patterns and as such provide a different perspective on ideological attitudes than the
traditional linear analyses.
Notwithstanding these potential shortcomings, our research provides a social psycholog-
ical analysis of social solidarity and social control that have become key themes in contem-
porary political debates. Examples of the contested nature of social solidarity include the
debate over healthcare reform in the United States and the European welfare retrenchment
debate where political discourse arguing for the necessity of cutbacks and greater condi-
tionality of welfare beneﬁts has gained ground in recent decades (e.g. Svallfors, 2012).
At the same time, criminologists have argued that there is a tendency to replace social
welfare programmes by harsher punitive policies (e.g. Wacquant, 2009; Young, 1999).
In Europe, the emphasis is shifting from social solidarity to stricter social control with a
‘new punitiveness’ paradigm evidenced in increased prison population rates and harsher
sentencing, and also in a more repressive political discourse (Garland, 2001; Snacken, 2010).Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 24: 406–421 (2014)
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Social solidarity and social control 419Our results suggest that the study of the various patterns associating social and punitive
attitudes at the level of individual attitudes may provide important insights for the public legit-
imacy of emerging models of social order.REFERENCES
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